ABSTRACT
Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Nordic states-Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden-exhibit similarities and differences. This article investigates the extent to which crisis policymaking diverges from normal policymaking within the Nordic countries and whether variations between the countries are associated with the role of expertise and the level of politicization. Government responses are analyzed in terms of governance arrangements and regulatory instruments. Findings demonstrate some deviation from normal policymaking within and considerable variation between the Nordic countries, as Denmark, Finland, and to some extent Norway exhibit similar patterns with hierarchical command and control governance arrangements, while Iceland, in some instances, resembles the case of Sweden, which has made use of network-based governance. The article shows that the higher the influence of experts, the more likely it is that the governance arrangement will be network-based.
ABSTRACT
The Covid-19 pandemic has spurred a discussion about the role of the European Union (EU) in the governance of cross-border health threats. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is another major global health challenge that requires international collective action to be resolved. By using survey data from experts on AMR from 29 European countries, this paper investigates the support for an increase in the power of EU over AMR. Based on insights from collective action theory, we hypothesize that experts who believe that other countries free ride, will be more supportive of EU as a Leviathan in the European response to AMR. The results show that the experts generally were strongly in favor of expanding the authority of the EU over AMR. Furthermore, in line with theoretical expectations, experts who think that other countries free ride, are particularly supportive of more EU power over AMR. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of European Integration is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)
ABSTRACT
Sweden's strategy to contain the COVID-19 pandemic stands out internationally as more liberal in terms of not ordering a complete lockdown of society. Sweden kept its primary schools, daycare centers and industries largely open. The government financially supported furloughed workers and increased its support to regional and local governments delivering healthcare and elderly care. However, the death toll in Sweden which passed 4000 by late May 2020 stands in stark contrast to those of other, comparable countries, raising questions about the design of the strategy, and its appropriateness. The paper argues that key assumptions sustaining the strategy, for instance that symptom-free people do not carry, and cannot transmit the Coronavirus, or that local and regional government staff had the necessary training and equipment to tackle the pandemic, along with problems associated with coordinating a decentralized healthcare system, may explain the poor performance of the Swedish containment strategy.